In the books Diasporas in the New Media Age: Identity, politics and community, and There’s No Jose Here by Gabriel Thompson, one encounters a story of our new age of migration. Within the former book, which consists of analytical essays on the topic of migration in the digital age, one is introduced to how Information Technology (IT) has changed the immigration experience. In the latter book, one joins Gabriel Thompson in an exploratory relationship with Enrique, a Mexican immigrant who navigates himself through the crazy life of an undocumented NYC resident. The objective and premise behind these books have broad and complicated focuses. Thompson’s creative non-fiction leads the reader through his personal narrative of becoming acquainted with Enrique and what it means to be a Mexican immigrant. Diasporas in the New Media Age seeks to unravel the nature of the IT world within the context of mass migration. Despite the different goals of these two books, one can find commonality on the topic of identity.

            While linking these two volumes of thought, the following pages will explore the idea of identity as a simulation. In the current information age, it seems that people are beginning to experiment with online or digital identities. The effect of these social networking or Internet profiles appears to allow people to re-invent their offline presentation, which begs the question “What is identity?” The abstract idea of identity becomes difficult to define because usually people describe “who they are” with social constructs of personality traits and environment. Even if one believes in a soul, the person will still have to confront the question “Is identity pre-determined or is it performed, developed, and re-created over time?” People define, interpret, and present themselves with what they identify themselves with (i.e. a simulation). Thompson’s narrative and the analysis of Diasporas in the New Media demonstrate that self-identity is a manifestation or simulation of competing social constructs within an individual and the person’s interactions with the surrounding environment.

            For example, Thompson records instances in which Enrique and Enrique’s brother Manuel act in a manner that reflects this idea of identity as a simulation. While discussing Enrique’s short temperament, which is perhaps a result of past drinking problems, Thompson describes the way Enrique views his own frequent outbursts: “When calm he spoke about his temper in a detached manner, as if he were describing something that existed independent of himself, over which he had little control” (p. 52). Enrique would hate to attribute anger as a part of his personality. In fact, Thompson suggests that if one asked Enrique explicitly, the Mexican immigrant would reject the notion that his tendency to randomly express outrage defines any aspect of his identity. As with other aspects of treating identity as a simulation, which Enrique seems to affirm, the social constructs that cause Enrique to lose his temper would have to persistently bombard and override other social constructs. As an author of Diaspora in the New Media Age understand digital identity, “Members use discussion forums to disseminate information . . . to reinforce or recreate identity to make it more . . . sustainable across generation” (Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, p. 40). According to this statement, identity is constantly fueled and changed by interacting with ideas (i.e. social constructs or information). Thus, in order to validate the claim that anger is instilled in Enrique’s identity, one must ask “What are the social constructs that have suppressed the constructs that keep Enrique’s anger in check?” Identity, or the simulation of identity that one normally refers to, becomes distinctive when competitive social constructs battles to the surface. A dramatic example of this idea is when Enrique observes Manuel declare, “The army has made me a soldier” (Thompson, p. 137). Essentially Manuel claims to have obtained a new identity by joining the military. Manuel allowed the army’s social constructs to reconfigure and down grade his civilian social constructs that reshaped his perception of self and others. If indeed identity is simulated by social constructs and environment, it is nonsensical to argue that one can transplant his/her identity to a different place without encountering compromise.

            Both Thompson and Brinkerhoff implicitly assert that as an immigrant transforms him/herself while integrating into a new set of social constructs, the person can still retain the characteristics of past identity. In the contexts of immigration, Brinkerhoff (2007) observes that “[I]dentity support . . . enables diasporans to integrate new ideas, values, and experience into their identity frame of reference, testing the boundaries for what it means to their homeland identity as well as a potentially more modern and individualistic adopted country identity” (p. 40). Immigrants have the ability to experiment with identity by joining likeminded communities that provide reinforcement and security from outside forces. Individuals within foreign or non-mainstream groups can re-vitalize community identities by allowing group and external social constructs to clash. Nonetheless, despite the exciting prospect of redefining the group, traditional social constructs will inevitably emerge from the hybrid identity. This is perhaps due to the fact that group solidarity often numbs environmental pressures because one becomes socialized to value internal more than external ideas. In fact, even if one lacks fellowship with a certain community, surrounding influences will lose power to compete against any socially constructive self with any intense group identity. A tangible example of this is when Thompson (2007) reports that “Enrique and Juana have actually unpacked a small section of Mexico, dirt and all” (p. 56) within New York City. Enrique transplanted a piece of Mexico into Brooklyn in order to exhibit the resilience of his Mexican values, beliefs and dreams (i.e. social constructs). The intriguing aspect of both Thompson and Brinkerhoff’s examples of the socially constructed self, which sounds like a form of determinism philosophy, is that they affirm autonomy. That is, Thompson and Brinkerhoff suggest that everyone possesses the will to decide “who they are” by removing oneself, participating in, or believing in a group worldview. Perhaps control over one’s own identity becomes most evident when a person’s social constructs faces overwhelming opposition to the point that the person must re-invent him/herself. As Thompson once describes Enrique’s comment to a certain situation, “’Remember what you said? We invent things when we need to’” (p. 155). People have the capacity to side or mix with sets of social constructs that simulate or express a particular identity. Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that identity represents either a fluctuating construct of constructs or an absolute entity that only expressively changes